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A UNIVERSITY’S SLIGHT INCONSISTENCY IN WRITTEN
POLICIES AND THE RESULTING COLOSSAL EFFECT ON
FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Yerin Cho
McGlone v. Cheek, 534 F. App’x 293 (6th Cir. 2013)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The case of McGlone v. Cheek concerned the potential
impairment of a citizen’s constitutional rights to free speech and due
process as a result of a public university’s inconsistent and vague
written policies.1 Plaintiff John McGlone (McGlone) brought action
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 against several officials employed
by the University of Tennessee (the University) in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee concerning the
University’s written policies on its sponsorship requirement.2 The
Sixth Circuit ultimately held that the University’s sponsorship
requirement policy was vague and unclear to a person of ordinary
intelligence, invited arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and
threatened to chill free speech.3
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff McGlone was a devout Christian who traveled to
public universities and their campuses to help spread the teachings of
Christianity to college students.4 McGlone was not compensated for
his faith-related speeches, nor was he represented by a religious
affiliation; he acted on his own volition.5
On August 25, 2010, McGlone alerted the University—located
in Knoxville, Tennessee—of his intention to speak on campus the
following day, as he had similarly done for his past visits.6 In
1

McGlone v. Cheek (McGlone I), 534 F. App’x 293, 294 (6th Cir. 2013).
McGlone v. Cheek (McGlone II), No. 3:11-CV-405, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18820,
at *11 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 15, 2012).
3
McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 298-99.
4
Id. at 294.
5
McGlone II, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18820, at *3.
6
McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 295. Between 2008 and 2010, McGlone visited the
University of Tennessee’s campus a total of five times. Id. Apart from his first visit,
McGlone always notified the University of his intention to speak on campus
beforehand. Id. He never encountered any difficulties with the University during his
prior visits. Id.
2
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response, the University’s Dean of Student Affairs7 (Dean of Student
Affairs) and the Associate Dean of Students8 (Associate Dean)
informed McGlone that he must acquire a University sponsor before
utilizing any open area of the campus.9 The Associate Dean further
explained that sponsorship must be provided “by a registered student
organization, staff, or faculty.”10
Conversely, in a separate communication, the University’s
legal counsel informed McGlone that those who were not affiliated
with the school must receive sponsorship from “students, faculty, or
staff.”11 The University’s legal counsel further provided to McGlone
the University’s two written policies: (1) the “Access to University
Property” policy12 and (2) the University student handbook.13 The
“Access to University Property” policy read as follows: “The
University’s campuses and facilities shall be restricted to students,
faculty, staff, guests, and invitees except on such occasions when all or
part of the campuses, buildings, stadia, and other facilities are open to
the general public.”14 Additionally, the student handbook defined
“guest” as “[a] person invited by a university student or employee to
visit the campus at a specific time, place, and occasion.”15
Conversely, the student handbook specifically addressed the
University’s sponsorship requirement, which required persons
unaffiliated with the University to obtain sponsorship in order to speak
on campus.16 In a section entitled “Freedom of Expression and
Speech,” the student handbook read as follows:
[R]egistered student organizations on campus
may freely select, without prior restraints,
persons they wish to invite as guest speakers.

7

The Dean of Student Affairs is responsible for the interpretation and administration
of University “regulations that pertain to expressive activities” on campus. McGlone
II, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18820, at *4.
8
The Associate Dean is responsible for the administration of University regulations
that pertain to campus activities. Id.
9
McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 295.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
The “Access to University Property” policy, or policy # 1720-1-2, was
promulgated by the University Board of Trustees in 1970 under the provisions of the
Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-101.
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. (emphasis added).
16
Id.
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There are no restrictions to control the point of
view expressed by speakers other than those
imposed by local, state, and federal laws. Any
person sponsored by a registered campus
organization is free to speak . . . . The criterion
for a negative decision will be a demonstrable
inability to make such physical arrangements.17
McGlone was led to understand that in order to comply with
the University’s sponsorship requirement, he needed to obtain
sponsorship from a registered student organization or a University
employee.18 McGlone failed in his attempts to ascertain proper
sponsorship from numerous Christian-based student organizations, the
Dean of Student Affairs, and the Associate Dean.19 Feeling “deterred
by the process,” and fearful of arrest, McGlone did not return to the
campus again.20
In 2011, McGlone filed a lawsuit claiming that the University’s
sponsorship requirement was unconstitutionally vague, and thus
violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech and
due process.21 The lawsuit named individually, and in their official
capacities, the Dean of Student Affairs, the Associate Dean, and the
University Chancellor.22
Specifically, McGlone alleged that the University’s vague
sponsorship requirement restrained and chilled his First Amendment
right to religious speech.23 McGlone further alleged that the lack of
objective guidelines or standards to guide the discretion of officials
who were charged with enforcing the policy violated his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process.24 Defendants, on the other hand,
contended that the University’s sponsorship requirement was clearly
established under the official “Access to University Property” policy,
allowing any student, faculty, or staff to have the authority to grant
sponsorship to visiting speakers.25

17

McGlone v. Cheek (McGlone II), No. 3:11-CV-405, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18820, at *6-7 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 15, 2012) (emphasis added).
18
McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 296.
19
Id. at 295-96.
20
Id. at 296; McGlone II, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18820, at *10.
21
McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 296.
22
McGlone II, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18820, at *11.
23
Id. at *12.
24
Id. at *13.
25
McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 296.
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McGlone moved for preliminary injunctive relief, hoping to
enjoin all appropriate University affiliates from further enforcing the
sponsorship requirement.26 Defendants moved to dismiss all claims.27
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee held that the University’s sponsorship requirement was not
vague, but rather “well delineated,” and did not give University
officials unbridled discretion to restrict speech.28 The district court
denied McGlone’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief and granted
Defendants’ motion to dismiss.29
III.

RATIONALE

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed.30 The Sixth Circuit
examined the issue of whether the inconsistency between the two
written University policies created a vagueness problem.31 The
vagueness doctrine has two goals: (1) to ensure a policy’s fair notice to
a man of ordinary intelligence and (2) to provide a policy’s explicit
standards for enforcement by officials.32
Indeed, inconsistency existed between the University’s two
written policies when one policy required, at a minimum, that a guest
acquire sponsorship from a registered student organization, while the
other only required sponsorship from an individual student or
University employee.33 Here, McGlone believed he had to acquire
sponsorship from a registered student organization in order to comply
with the University’s sponsorship requirement.34 At the time, the
University had 395 registered student organizations.35 Had McGlone
acted under the provisions of the student handbook, he could have
requested sponsorship from any of the more than 27,000 enrolled
students or more than 8,000 University employees.36 Thus, although

26

McGlone II, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18820, at *13.
Id. at *14.
28
Id. at *31, *42.
29
McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 296.
30
Id. at 294.
31
Id. at 297. The inconsistency issue was only first presented during the appellate
oral arguments. Id. at 296. Because the Sixth Circuit found the potential injustice to
free speech to be adequately exceptional, it found sua sponte review of the issue to
be appropriate. Id. at 297.
32
Ass’n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir.
2007).
33
See McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 295.
34
Id. at 296.
35
Id. at 298.
36
Id. at 294-95.
27

2014]

A UNIVERSITY’S SLIGHT INCONSISTENCY

207

the written policies for the sponsorship requirement varied little in
wording, the implications were far more substantial.
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the lower court erred in
finding that the University’s sponsorship requirement was well
delineated.37 The Sixth Circuit held that the sponsorship requirement
was unconstitutionally vague and unclear, quickly noting that the mere
fact that the Dean of Student Affairs, the Associate Dean, and the
University’s legal counsel all gave McGlone conflicting information
was sufficient proof of the policy’s failure to ensure the first goal of
the vagueness doctrine: fair notice to people of ordinary intelligence.38
Furthermore, McGlone’s experiences with the University prior to
August 25, 2010—successfully speaking on campus without
University interference—also exemplified the University’s
inconsistent enforcement of the sponsorship requirement.39
The Sixth Circuit further held that the ambiguous language of
the inconsistent policies invited a practice of discriminatory
enforcement of the sponsorship requirement.40 Defendants contended
at trial that the “Access to University Property” policy was the official
guest speaker policy for the University.41 The “Access to University
Property” policy, however, was silent as to who had the authoritative
discretion for the delegation of the sponsorship requirement.42 On the
other hand, the student handbook made clear that a guest speaker
would be denied only if there was an inability to make appropriate
physical arrangements.43
Although the University contended that it held no power to
revoke a guest’s sponsorship once successfully acquired, it did not
deny that only a University-affiliated individual held the initial power
to invoke sponsorship upon chosen guests.44 The mere possibility of a
University official taking advantage of inconsistencies in policies to
foreclose the option of sponsorship for undesirable individuals was
sufficient for the Sixth Circuit to make a finding of plausible
vagueness.45 The Sixth Circuit further found the University’s

37

Id. at 294.
Id. at 298.
39
Id. at 295.
40
Id. at 298.
41
Id. at 296.
42
Id. at 298.
43
See McGlone v. Cheek (McGlone II), No. 3:11-CV-405, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18820, at *6-7 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 15, 2012) (discussing the student handbook’s
Freedom-of-Expression policy, which delineates that denial of sponsorship may only
be based on the inability to provide adequate physical arrangements).
44
McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 298.
45
Id.
38
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sponsorship requirement vulnerable to arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement due to inconsistency and ambiguity of the policies, failing
the second goal of the vagueness doctrine.46
Lastly, the Sixth Circuit feared that the inconsistency in the
University’s policies ultimately threatened to chill an individual’s First
Amendment right to free speech.47
Here, McGlone attempted to defend specifically his First
Amendment right to religious speech.48 Endeavoring to narrow the
legal issue of this case to only that of free religious speech, however,
would leave the analysis incomplete.
Although McGlone’s
constitutional rights of free speech and due process were at stake, the
main legal issue focused on the vagueness of the University’s written
policies regarding the sponsorship requirement.49
It is important to note that the Sixth Circuit did not challenge,
or even address, the lower court’s finding that the open areas of the
University’s campus were limited public fora.50 “In a limited public
forum, the government need not allow persons to engage in every type
of speech, and may exclude a speaker who is not a member of the class
for whose special benefit the forum was created.”51 The single
objection the Sixth Circuit made over the University’s sponsorship
requirement was the lack of consistency between the two written
policies.52 As such, both the lower court and the Sixth Circuit did not
deny the University’s capacity to preclude sponsorship from certain
types of guest speakers, as long as the policies were rewritten in a

46

Id.
Id. at 299.
48
Id. at 294.
49
Id. at 297.
50
See McGlone v. Cheek (McGlone II), No. 3:11-CV-405, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18820, at *25 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 15, 2012). During its analysis, the district court
noted a limited public forum is government-owned property that is “limited to use by
certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects,” usually
under some type of sponsorship requirement. Id. at *19-20 (quoting Miller v. City of
Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524, 534-35 (6th Cir. 2010)). The three other types of fora are:
(a) traditional public forum, (b) designated public forum, and (c) nonpublic forum.
McGlone II, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18820, at *18. A traditional public forum is a
public area, such as a street, sidewalk, or park, which the government devotes to
open assembly and debate. Id. at *18-19. A designated public forum is public
property that is traditionally not a place for public debate or assembly, but the
government allows it to be treated as a traditional public forum. Id. at *19. A
nonpublic forum is a publicly-owned property that is not designated as a forum for
public communication. Id. at *21.
51
Id. at *20 (citing Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001);
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
52
McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 297-98.
47
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more concise, coherent manner and did not discriminate based on
viewpoint.53 In essence, both of the University’s written policies were
facially constitutional when considered separately.
Overall, the ramifications of McGlone are slight. The
University will likely review and rewrite its written policies regarding
sponsorship requirement in a more consistent manner, as well as any
other applicable policies that might include any other inconsistencies.
Other private and public institutions should take note of this case
because of its implications. Indeed, the same plaintiff, McGlone, filed
a nearly identical lawsuit against Tennessee Technological University
(“TTU”) in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee a year before the instant case, indicating the prevalence of
such claims.54 That case also made it to the Sixth Circuit, where a
similar result ensued.55
Although painstaking, institutions must take meticulous
measures to promote consistent and straightforward written policies.
Institutions should not regard this as a radical alteration but rather an
overdue requisite.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the outcome of McGlone, while not
revolutionary, reemphasized the fundamental understanding that a
policy, rule, statute, or law, which intends to enforce any requirement
upon an individual, must be sufficiently consistent and plainly
coherent in its language so that an ordinary person of common
intelligence will be able to easily understand it and protect his or her
own constitutional rights.

53

See id. at 299; McGlone II, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18820, at *23-24.
See McGlone v. Bell (McGlone III), 681 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2012). See generally
Gilles v. Garland, 281 F. App'x 501 (6th Cir. 2008) (dismissing plaintiff’s free
speech and due process claims against Miami University and its unwritten
sponsorship requirement policy); Gilles v. Miller, 501 F. Supp. 2d 939 (W.D. Ky.
2007) (denying a motion for preliminary injunctive relief brought by the same
plaintiff from Gilles v. Garland regarding a similar sponsorship requirement policy
at Murray State University).
55
McGlone III, 681 F.3d at 722.
54
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